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I. Introduction 
In the concept of the law of State 
administration and/or administrative law, 
Government action in question is the Act or acts 
committed by State administration in carrying out 
the task of Government.   CF. Strong, interprets 
the State administration is any organ or body that 
has the power of the public. Whereas the task of 
the Government that tasks not included in the task 
of creating the rules and duties of the judge (the 
theory of the time). Thus, the Government action 
in question not just done by the Agency of the 
public whose name the Executive, but also 
carried out by the legislative and the judicial.  In 
theory the Trias politica from Monstesquieu, the 
country was then given the function of the 
formation of laws (legislation), the function of 
implementing legislation (Government) and the 
function of the judge (Justice). These functions 
then divided into three State agencies runs out, 
that is, legislative, Executive, and judicial.  
Based on the principle of legality as the 
embodiment of the principles of State law, then 
the execution of the functions and the powers of 
Government should be put on the rule of law, i.e.: 
 - any powers in the State should base on the law; 
-available the implementation of the and legal 
protection of the use of the powers of the 
Government; -the principle of the responsibility 
to sue (liability) of any use of the authority. 
In administrative law, the implementation of the 
principle of the legality of it became more 
important in the relationship between the 
Government of the people. On the one hand 
provide legal protection for the people who ruled, 
on the other hand, limits the use of the powers of 
Government. If then there a diversion and/or 
abuse of authority by officials of The State then 
open the possibility do legal complain as a 
manifestation of the accountability law (legal 
accountability). Which a form of legal liability so 
that every action of the State Administrative 
officials or Government action can account for 
the functional supervisory bodies or agencies of 
the legislative, and the judicial bodies. The latter 
called control judicial against government actions 
whether through judicial or public Administrative 
Justice to the Supreme Court of the country as 
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Cassation level courts. Under article 24 C of the 
Constitution of the year 1945, NRI judiciary 
incremented one more that is the Constitutional 
Court, the special handle attempt to create 
problems. 
Based on the above arguments, then the compiled 
pattern work below as the focus of our discussion 
is the issue/: 
1. The territorial agency performance 
accountability; 
2. Performance accountability Executive 
Board; 
3. Judicial agency performance 
accountability. 
 
II. Performance Accountability Legislation 
 
Based on the Constitution of 1945, the Year NRI 
legislative represented to the parliament as a body 
of common law (article 20). Although there is a 
DPD, these bodies only positioned as an auxiliary 
organ of the support functions of the house 
legislation. Therefore, with the presence of new 
representative institutions as DPD in the system's 
attempt to Indonesia, does not mean that 
Indonesia has embraced a Bicameral system, but 
it is still a unicameral system. Two representative 
systems (bicameral system) not seen in the 
existence of the two organs as representative 
institutions, but do they have the Authority 
organs of the formation of laws. The presence of 
a country that is not functional, the existence 
and/or the performance of the is questionable 
because it does not have a product state 
administration that is directly beneficial to the 
interests of the community, the nation, and the 
State. Even his presence only as political assessor 
thus burdening the State budget to finance the 
State's inefficiency occurs. Therefore, the 
Agency should be evaluated through a revision of 
the Constitution to give the same strong role with 
the HOUSE towards the creation of a strong 
bicameral system is effective. If this agency 
should not just have liquidated and reaffirmed the 
constitutional basis of our representative system 
that was a unicameral system without DPD. Even 
the presence of any questionable MPR because in 
addition to no longer have the authority routinely 
continuously, also lack interest representation. If 
the HOUSE of representatives representing the 
political interests of the community as a whole 
(political representation), then the house of 
representatives to represent the interests of the 
region (Regional representation). If the MPR 
interests who represented? If it's just to run the 
three MPR authority under article 3 of the 
constitution of the year 1945, then the NRI can 
only be carried out by the House and DPD in the 
joint session of the forum (joint session) that does 
not make it as an independent institution such as 
the MPR now These. 
Performance accountability areas of legislation 
the house marked with national legislation and 
the establishment of the Act. Whether laws that 
formed in a single year budget amount complies 
with the national legislation programmed as this 
relates to performance measures and budget state 
budget burden.  
In the formation of the Act, the performance of 
the parliament is very related to the enforceability 
of the law. J.J.H. Bruggink, divide the 
enforceability of the law into three sections, 
namely the enforceability of factual, normative, 
enforceability and evaluative. 
Enforceability of factual relating to the 
effectiveness of the methods of compliance due 
to legal residents on the rule of law, because the 
law intervenes and empiric in favor of their 
interests. Enforceability of normative (formal 
enforceability) is if the method that is part of a 
system of the specific legal method in which 
mutual pointing one against the other. While the 
enforceability of evaluative, is the legal 
enforceability of the methods because of its 
content is viewed. Or the method of the law by a 
person or a Community accepted. According to 
the author of an act not through the process of its 
formation as aforesaid, then based on the thought 
that Act least Bruggink has only formal or 
normative method of enforceability of the law but 
has no enforceability of factual and enforceability 
of evaluative. Karel Frequently in his book dear 
reader the rules stated only Sinaga has value 
semantic, i.e., legally valid indeed but merely to 
give form or exercise the political power for the 
benefit of the holders of power. 
Good legislation is legislation which qualifies 
this enforceability so effective and acceptable to 
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the community. In Act No. 12 the Year 2011 
about the formation of legislation, there is the 
principle of the formation of legislation which 
describes the enforceability of terms above.  
The court often cancels much of this latter Act 
through a process of judicial a review. Saldi Isra 
mention since the year 2003-2009 there is 
approximately 247 of the ACT presented to the 
constitutional court to tested the validity of the 
enactment, 58 of which granted. This is due, 
among others, the formulation of normative 
formulae should be charge material ACT colored 
by political expediency is practically making the 
ACT of losing the spirit of enforceability.   Based 
on an ACT in the exercise of his duties, MD3, the 
house of representatives through the Committee 
for the designer of the Act can do: 
1. Work meetings with the Government, a 
local government district/city, 
provincial; 
2. Public Hearing (RDPU); 
3. Hold the working visits; 
4. Hold a comparative study; 
Even on other parts, said that against the 
aspirations of the community, members of 
Parliament convened, absorb, hold and follow up. 
This provision of its nature is imperative and not 
a facultative, since it is related to the principle of 
openness in the formation of the ACT as set forth 
in Act No. 12 the Year 2011 that is, in the process 
of formation of the regulations starting from the 
planning, preparation, the preparation of, and 
discussion, is transparent and open. Thus, all 
walks of life to have a chance of existence to 
provide input into the process of the formation of 
legislation. The formation of the Act without the 
participation of the community is a model 
democracy piracy elite. Danial Sparringga calls it 
democracy lost their lives (zombies) that there is 
a practice of no value, but there was a process but 
lost his spirit. There is a body but did not have the 
heart (undead). That's the case, our democratic 
system produces a zombie because there is a 
body, but no lives. Analogous in the thoughts 
above, deviations against the mechanism and 
neglect against the participation of the public in 
the process of formation of the Act will make the 
Act was the loss of the spirit with a value of 
normatively, except it only has value semantic. 
More than that would also affect the strength of 
the validity period. 
 
III. Performance Accountability 
Executive Board 
In a presidential system of Government, 
accountability for performance controlled 
through the leadership of the head of Government 
is called the President. The President is not 
accountable to Parliament but is responsible 
according to the Constitution. Based on the 
constitution of the 1945 Year NRI, new President 
of the liability occurred when the President of the 
criminal law, in the form of treason against the 
State, corruption, bribery, other heavy criminal 
acts, or conduct reprehensible, and/or the 
President and/ or the Vice President no longer 
qualify as the President and/or Vice President. In 
contrast to the presidential accountability based 
on the 1945 Constitution (amendments to pre), in 
which the President can be dismissed offhand by 
the MPR merely because the President did the 
breach of the GBHN. The dismissal of the 
President right now is two mechanisms, i.e., the 
mechanism of political and legal mechanisms. 
Political mechanism in the form of the opinion of 
the house of representatives that the President do 
violations of the law as the provisions of article 
7B subsection (1), while the political mechanism 
if the constitutional court through the nine judge 
constitution decided that the house of 
representatives agreed with the opinion in up, and 
then returned to the house of representatives and 
continued to the mpr after the internal mechanism 
through the decision of the house of 
representatives. The crucial thing that needs 
assessment is can the MPR decided on the 
dismissal of the President are the same as the 
desired House and MK? 
This question deliberately asked questions 
because of the number of members of Parliament 
(560 members) fewer than the number of 
members of the assembly, where there is the 
addition of the 132 members of the DPD and so 
the total number of the MPR members as much 
as 692 members. The amount of this very 
influential voice against the majority of the to 
dismiss the President or the Vice-President if the 
DPD does not agree with the House of 
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representatives and then merged with the number 
of votes of representatives who not agree with the 
majority of the parliament to dismiss the 
president, then could just woke up a new 
conspiracy not to dismiss the president. 
The mechanism of this model is very potential 
result in two things, namely, making the ruling of 
the constitutional court does not have the power 
of executorial, and may give rise to political 
instability which affect economic jolts and 
disruption of security. 
Therefore, this constitutional provision should 
then be evaluated for revised in two alternatives, 
namely, first, the political mechanism in the 
House and the mechanism of the law in the 
Constitutional Court are retained, but the need for 
an additional clause to get certainty the law stops 
so that the ruling of the constitutional court is the 
verdict is final and binding and has the force of 
executorial. the second alternative if the mpr is 
still required then ruling mpr nature declarator to 
strengthen the legal position has been decided by 
the constitutional court (constitutive).  
 
IV. Judicial Agency Performance 
Accountability 
The Cinstitution 1945 NRI determine as the 
perpetrator of the powers of the judiciary, not just 
carried out by MA and other judicial institutions 
but also done by the Constitutional Court. Two 
things that need to scrutinize is the first, about the 
recruitment of Judges and surveillance behavior 
of judges, and second, the accountability of 
judges of the constitutional court. 
4.1. Recruitment of Judges and surveillance 
behavior of Judges 
A. Recruitment of Judges. 
Political commitment has become a 
constitutionally enshrined into the task of 
the judicial Commission (KY), but KY is 
in a State of institutional system is 
categorized as an Auxiliary organ of the 
state, i.e., as an organ of support against 
the main state organs (the house of 
representatives ) but does not have the 
authority the KY. Towards the creation 
of a Chief Justice who is professional, 
and free from the influence of any power, 
then it should be given a role that KY 
specify so that the mechanism of 
appointment shortened without any 
political influence House and ends at 
KY's level. Except that any supposed KY 
membership recruitment more tightened 
with a public test mechanism by an adhoc 
Institute a credible and accountable. 
 
B. Supervision of The Behavior of 
Judges 
Authority of KY in the same field his 
position with that of Chief Justice 
recruitment agencies support because the 
work of supervision delivered to The 
Supreme Court Of. Is the question can 
the Supreme Court Of finalty gave the 
judges themselves? Is it not the same as 
the words of Joshua in his ads "the 
Orange eats oranges?". Therefore, it is in 
this field, KY must be given the task of 
determining the final project or 
independently to provide coaching in two 
things, namely, coaching for the judges 
awarding achievers in the form of a 
reword and against rogue judges given 
punishment by clear rules. To empower 
there is no other way except there is a 
revision of the constitution against NRI 
Year 1945.  
 
4.2. Accountability of Judges of 
Constitutional Court 
Compared to the MA verdict is still very 
conventional, then the Constitutional Court has 
shown a positive performance and many an 
award being progressive. If MA still resting on 
the justice procedural, then the court in an award 
already reflects the principle of substantive 
justice. The application of substantive justice is 
already by article 24 paragraph (1) of the 
constitution of the 1945 Year NRI, namely to 
organize the judiciary to enforce the law and 
justice. The judge's ruling means the 
consideration of not only the formal rules rely on 
the (written) who formulated rigorously (judge as 
trumpeting the Act) but should also based on the 
rule of law is not written. The application of the 
principle of substantive justice reflected through 
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the ruling of the constitutional court that is 
conditionally constitutional (e.g. application of 
chapter 160 of the criminal code conditional, the 
use of id card passport as identity selector &). 
Conditionally Unconstitutional (contrary to the 
Constitution conditional), e.g., the convicted 
person can become parliamentary candidates and 
prospective KDH., and the verdict of, such as the 
repeated voting and counting, head of KPK in the 
case of Bibit Samad Rianto & Chandra m. 
Hamzah, i.e. new can dismissed after a court 
decision that has the force of law remain. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
In a presidential system of Government, 
accountability for performance is controlled 
through the leadership of the head of Government 
is called the President. The President is not 
accountable to Parliament but is responsible 
according to the Constitution. Based on the 
Constitution of the 1945 NRI, new President of 
the liability occurred when the President of the 
criminal law, in the form of treason against the 
State, corruption, bribery, other heavy criminal 
acts, or conduct reprehensible, and/or the 
President and/ or the Vice President no longer 
qualify as the President and/or Vice President. In 
contrast to the presidential accountability based 
on the 1945 Constitution (amendments to pre), in 
which the President can be dismissed offhand by 
the MPR merely because the President did the 
breach of the GBHN 
Became the pride of MK's performance but need 
to get constitutional guarantees so they can be 
measured exactly, including firmness settings 
related to the expansion of the authority of the 
court. In article 24 C of the Constitution 1945 
Year NRI authorizes the court determined 
limitative in IE is limited to four the authority and 
a single liability, but now plus a new election 
authority KDH & KDH Deputy categorized as 
election regime so that disputes the election 
results of the head region and Deputy head the 
area became the competence of the court and no 
longer be a competence of MA as regulated in the 
law No. 32 of the year 2004. To prevent the 
authorities of the new MK memorable 
unconstitutional, then the necessary revision of 
some provisions of the Constitution of 1945 for 
Year NRI synchronized with the authority, 
namely Article 22E and article 24C, so that the 
court can also be granted authority other based on 
ACT like other authorities given to MA as 
referred to in article 24A subsection (1) that "the 
other has the authority given by law". 
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